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APPENDIX 25- PENDING FEDERAL REFORMS 
A comprehensive discussion of pending federal reform proposals as 
of February I, 2000 is contained in PRELIMINARYREPORT# I: AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE CURRENT LEGAL STRUCTURES GoVERNING THE PERFECTION AND 
PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN lNTEILEcluAL PROPERTY AND AN 
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED REFORMS at section IV, pages 166-188. 
APPENDIX 26- THE EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY UPON A FIRM USING PATENTS 
AND TRADEMARKS AS COLLATERAL 
by Lois R. Lupica 
© Lois R. Lupica 200 I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Bankruptcy Code sets forth an orderly process for the 
distribution of a debtor-in- bankruptcy's assets. This process has the effect 
of altering many of the procedural and substantive rights and obligations of 
the debtor, as well as of the debtor's creditors. Parties asserting a property 
interest in assets of a debtor in bankruptcy, however, must rely on non­
bankruptcy law to determine the nature and extent of their property 
interests. The most commonly asserted interest by creditors involved in a 
bankruptcy are security interests. 
Security interests are consensual liens that arise at the inception of 
a credit transaction. While security interests are enforceable between parties 
to the credit transaction and as against third parties at the moment of their 
creation, secured parties must "perfect" their interests for their interests to 
Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. B.S. 
1981, Cornell University; J.D. 1987, Boston University School of Law. 
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survive a bankruptcy filing. The importance of tbe concept of perfection 
of security interests in bankruptcy cannot be overstated. An unperfected 
security interest can be avoided by the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy for the 
benefit of the bankruptcy estate. "Perfection for purposes of the 
Bankruptcy Code means priority against the ordinary creditor witb a judicial 
lien (the lien creditor). 
The body of non-bankruptcy law most often implicated when 
personal property is used as collateral is the state law captured in Article 9 
of tbe Uniform Commercial Code(U.C.C.). Article 9 went through a major 
revision in 1998. Both tbe "old" and "revised" versions of the Article 
outline the rules for perfecting security interests in personal property 
collateral, and define the priority rights held by secured parties. Primary 
among tbe priority rights defined in Article 9 is tbe rule that a security 
interest that is perfected by a proper state notice filing has priority over the 
creditor with a competing lien (tbe lien creditor). The priority rule for lien 
creditors is just one of many rules in Article 9 designed to provide clear and 
certain rights to all parties in competition with security interests in all forms 
of personal property. Intangible personal property falls within the broad 
jurisdictional scope of Article 9. 
The scope of Article 9, however, is not absolute. To the extent 
that Article 9 is preempted by another body of fedeml law, the preempting 
law governs tbe issue of how to establish a "perfected" security interest. 
Both the Patent Act and the Lanham Act include recording and transfer 
provisions. Both of these provisions protect subsequent purchasers against 
unrecorded assignments. It does not appear from the face of either statute, 
however, tbat the ordinary lien creditor qualifies as a protected purchaser. 
The preemptive force of these statutes remains uncertain, however, because 
some courts have defined tbe concept of protected transferee very broadly 
when dealing witb federal recording provisions. 
This uncertainty takes on greater urgency when tbe debtor, as owner 
of tbe intellectual property, files for bankruptcy protection.' Bankruptcy 
provides an acid test for the efficacy of non-bankruptcy law perfection of 
security interests; unperfected security interests are subject to avoidance in 
bankruptcy. The following sections outline the central effects of bankruptcy 
upon a firm using patents and trademarks as collateral. 
See btto;l/www.thestandard.com/articleldispla>(listing, in what is called the "Dot-com 
Flop Tracker" internet companies that have failed). 
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PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 
A. 	 Perfection Put to the Section 544(a) Avoiding Powers 
Test 
Non-bankruptcy legal regimes outline the methods for the transfer 
of interests in patents and trademarks - namely the Patent Act' and the 
Lanham Act.' Both of these federal statutes provides a method of 
documenting and recording interests in intellectual property by the specific 
property number assigned by the appropriate federal regulatory agency. A 
structural element common to these statutes is their linkage of the concepts 
of transfer and title. 
Financiers seeking to take a security interest in most types of 
personal property look to Article 9, which dissociates the concept of title 
and security interest transfers and provides an efficient and streamlined 
method of attachment and perfection of security interests. Article 9 states, 
subject to certain specified exceptions, that it governs "any transaction 
(regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in 
personal property or fixtures including goods, documents, instruments, 
general intangibles, chattel paper or accounts ...."' As comprehensive in 
scope as Article 9 is, it also recognizes its potential for displacement, in 
deference to the federal intellectual property regimes.' Both the Patent Act 
and the Lanham Act address the issue of transfer of an interest in 
intellectual property, but do not specifically mention, in the language of 
Article 9, the issues of creation, attachment, perfection and priority of 
security interests. Moreover, Article 9 simply provides that ifanother body 
of law governs these matters, then Article 9 steps-back or is preempted. 
Section 9-1 04(a) of old Article 9, known as the "step-back" provision reads: 
This Article does not apply to a security interest subject to 
Section 261 of the Patent Act states, "Anassignment, grant or conveyance shall be void 
as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration, without 
notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months 
from its date or prior to the date of subsequent purchase or mortgage." 35 U.S. C. § 261 
(1994). 
Section I 060 of the Lanham Act reads in part: An assignment shall be void as against 
any subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, unless it is 
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months after the date thereof 
or prior to such subsequent purchase. 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994). 
u.c.c. § 9-102 (1996). 
U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (1996). 
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any statute of the United States to the extent that such 
statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties 
affected by transactions in particular types of property.' 
Moreover, old section 9-302(3)(a) stares that an Article 9 filing "is 
not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject 
to "a statute . . . of the United States which provides for a national or 
international registration ... or which specifies a place of filing different 
from that specified in this Article."' The Official Comment to section 9­
302(3)(a) states: 
Subsection (3) exempts from the filing provisions of this 
Article transactions as to which an adequate system of 
filing, state or federal, has been set up outside this Article 
and subsection (4) makes clear that when such a system 
exists perfection of a relevant security interest can be had 
only through compliance with that system (i.e., filing under 
this Article is not a permissible alternative).' 
Revised Article 9 also provides for the preemption of its provisions 
by federal statute in sections 9-109(c)(l) and 9-3ll(a)(l).' It should be 
noted that the new filing preemption language in section 9-31I(a)(l) does 
not direct perfection or filing questions towards a statute of the United 
States unless that statute contains a priority rule for lien creditors. 
It is not apparent, however, from the text of either "old" or 
"revised" Article 9 nor from the law addressing the title and transfer of 
interests in patents and trademarks, exactly which legal regime governs the 
attachment, perfection and determination of priority of security interests 
in patents and trademarks. This is of concefi! because the issue of 
perfection of security interests in patents and trademarks is at the heart of 
many of the fundamental issues that arise in a debtor-with-intellectual­
property's bankruptcy. 
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, its trustee becomes interested 
in determining whether any ·non-bankruptcy claimed rights (such as 
• Id. 
7 u.c.c. § 9-302(3)(•) (1996). 
U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(a) (1996) cmt. 
9 U.C.C. [Revised]§ 9-3II(a)(l). 
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perfected security interests) are vulnerable to defeat." The trustee has the 
power, under § 544(a) of the bankruptcy code, to upset the interests of an 
unperfected creditor, thereby limiting the creditor's ability to receive the 
full measure of what they are owed in the debtor's bankruptcy." As the 
cases discussed below illustrate, perfection of security interests for § 544(a) 
purposes is the most common context for the questions about perfection. 
The issue of perfection of security interests also arises in the context of the 
trustee's avoidance powers pursuantto section 54 7 (preferences) and section 
548 (fraudulent conveyances). Preferences and fraudulent conveyances in 
the context of transfers of interests of patents and trademarks will be 
discussed in Part III. 
(i) Perfection ofSecurity Interests in Patents 
The Patent Act states that the "assignment, grant or conveyance" 
of an interest in a patent "shall be void against any subsequent purchaser or 
mortgagee" unless the assignment, grant or conveyance is recorded in the 
PTO within three months from its date, or prior to the date of such 
purchase or mortgage." While this provision is designed to address the issue 
of the steps necessary to be taken to effectuate a transfer of interest in a 
patent, it is not clear the extent to which this provision preempts Article 
9 when the transferred interest at issue is security interest. 
The court in In re Transportation Design and Technology, Inc.," 
addressed the question of whether the section 261 of the Patent Act 
preempts Article 9 with respect to transfers of security interests in patents. 
The court stated that the language in the Patent Act providing for the 
recordation of an assignment speaks to the issue of a transfer of title and 
The trustee ... may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation" 
incurred by the debtor that is voidable by ­
(I) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of the 
case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all 
property in which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such a judicial 
lien, whether or not such a creditor exists; II U.S.C. § 544(a)(l)(l997). 
II 	 Under Section 54l(a)(3), interests recovered under§ S50_become property of the estate. 
Section 54l(a)(3) reads: (a) ... (The] estate is compnseo· of all of the following 
property, wherever located and by whomever held: (3) Any interest in property that the 
trustee recovers under section ... 550... of this title. II U.S.C. § 54l(a)(3) (1997). 
35 u.s.c. § 261 (1994)," 
" 	 In re Transportation Design and Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 635 (Banlcr. S.D. Cal. 1985). 
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does not include within its meaning the transfer of a security interest. The 
Transportation Design court concluded that only an Article Nine filing 
protects the secured party with an interest in a recorded patent against the 
bankruptcy trustee. The court did note in dicta, however, that recording 
under section 261 of the Patent Act is necessary to protect the secured 
party against subsequent assignees of the patent, including a secured party 
that characterized its security interest as a "conditional assignment." 
Following the lead of Transportation Design, the Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel in In re Cybernetics Services, Inc., held that only an Article 
9 filing was sufficient to perfect a security interest in a patent. In this case, 
the debtor owned a patent for a video signal collection device. Creditor had 
a security interest in all of debtor's assets, including "general intangibles" 
and filed a financing statement to perfect its security interest in the Article 
9 filing office. No financing statement filed or recordation of a transfer of 
interest was made in the Patent office. Upon debtor's bankruptcy, creditor 
moved for relief from the automatic stay in order to enforce its security 
interest in the patent. The trustee opposed this motion and argued that the 
creditor's security interest in the patents was unperfected and therefore 
avoidable because the transfer of interest was not recorded in the Patent 
office. 
The BAP determined that to establish priority against involuntarily 
lienholders, including the trustee in bankruptcy, the creditor must perfect its 
interest pursuant to the terms of Article 9. A recording with the Patent and 
Trademark Office is insufficient to provide constructive notice of a transfer 
of a security interest. The court continued by observing that in defining 
transfer of ownership, in contrast to the Copyright Act, the Patent Act does 
not use words such as "mortgage" and "hypothecation" in addition to the 
term "assignment.'" Accordingly, the Patent Act does not preempt Article 
Section 101 of the Copyright Act reads: A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an 
assignment, mortgage, exclusive licenses, or any other conveyance, alienation or 
hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a 
copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a 
nonexclusive license. Section 205 (c) & (d) read: (c) Recordation as Constructive 
Notice. - Recordation of a document in the Copyright Office gives all persons 
constructive notice of the facts stated in the recorded document, but only if-(l) the 
document, or material anached to it, specifically identifies the work to which it pertains 
so that, after the document is indexed by the Register of Copyrights, it would be 
revealed by a reasonable search under the title or registration number of the work; and 
(2) registration has been made for the work. (d) Priority Between Conflicting Transfers. 
- As between two conflicting transfers, the one executed first prevails if it is recorded, 
in the manner required to give constructive notice under subsection (c), within one 
month after its execution in the United States or within two months after its execution 
outside the United States, or at any time before recordation in such manner of the later 
transfer. Otherwise the later transfer prevails if recorded first in such manner, and if 
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9 to the same extent that the Copyright Act does. The Patent Act 
however, does provide priority rules for subsequent mortgages and 
purchasers, and thus no such transfer is effective against such parties in the 
absence of a recordation of the transfer in the PTO. 
The case of City Bank and Trust Co. v. Octo Fabric, Inc·" offers an 
illustration of the adverse consequences that can befall creditors who are 
confused by the language of the Patent Act and its relationship to Article 9 
and the Bankruptcy Code. In Otto Fabric, Creditor recorded a transfer of 
an interest in debtors patents in the Patent Office within 90 days of debtor's 
bankruptcy. It had also previously filed an Article 9 financing statement, 
outside of the 90 day period. The bankruptcy trustee argued that the 
security interest ought to be avoided as a preference since a recordation of 
creditor's interest was made during the preference period. The bankruptcy 
court held, in reliance on the comments to section 9-302 stating that "the 
federal patent assignment statute occupies the field of filing." The 
bankruptcy court concluded that the recordation of the security interest in 
the Patent Office perfected secured creditor's interest, and because such 
perfection was within 90 days of bankruptcy, the transfer was an avoidable 
preference.1 ' The bankruptcy court also observed that a "single and absolute 
system of securing a creditor's interest in patents as collateral" was 
preferable, and this conclusion was supported by case law.1 ' "Requiring both 
federal and U.C.C. filing to perfect a creditor's interest in a patent would be 
contrary" to the purpose of Article 9, which is to provide "a rational and 
convenient filing system for security interests.''~' · 
The District Court disagreed with the bankruptcy court's findings 
and conclusions citing several independent grounds. 1 ' First, the court 
taken in good faith, for valuable consideration or on the basis ofa binding promise to 
pay royalties, and without notice of the earlier transfer. 17 U.S.C. § § 101, 205 (c) & (d) 
(1994). 
IS City Bank and Trust, Co. v. Otto Fabric, 83 B.R. 780, 781-82 (D. Kan. 1988). 
In re Otto Fabric, Inc., 55 B.R. 654 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985). 
n The Bankruptcy Court cited in support of its conclusion that a patent may be assigned 
as collateral for a loan Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 260 (1891); Magnuson 
Industries, Inc. v. Co-Rect Products, Inc., 676 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1981); Railex 
Corporation v. Joseph Guss & Sons, Inc., 40 F.R.D. 119 (D. D.C. 1966). It further 
observed that two circuits have noted that the patent as.signment statute "does not 
require recording to support the validity of an assignment, except as to subsequent 
purchasers or mortgagees without notice, and by implication recognizes the validity 
as to all others." Citing, Why Corporation v. Super Ironer Corporation, 128 F.2d 539, 
541 (6th Cir. 1942); John Tuman & Sons, Inc. v. Basse, 113 F2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1940). 
In re Otto Fabric, Inc., 55 B.R. 654 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985). 
I 9 City Bank and Trust v. Otto Fabric, 83 B.R. 780. 
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observed that the "federal statute does not expressly state that one must file 
an assignment with the Patent and Trademark Office to perfect a security 
interest. .. .If Congress intended to preempt the field of filing, it could have 
said so."" Second, the language of Section 261 of the Patent Act says that 
recordation in the Patent Office is necessary to protect againstthe interests 
of a "subsequent purchaser or mortgagee" and makes no mention of lien 
creditors. Thus, the court continued, the federal statute leaves open "a state 
filing to protect one's security interest in a patent against a lien creditor."" 
Finally, the court concluded, "to require a federal filing and thus a collateral 
assignment to perfect a security interest in a patent seems inconsistent with 
the modem notion that a grant of a security interest need not include the 
conveyance of title or ownership rights."" 
(ii) Perfection ofSecurity Interests in Trademarks 
Similar to the Patent Act, the Lanham Act provides for the 
recordation of assignments of trademarks, together with trademark holders' 
goodwill. The Lanham Act, however, does not define the term 
"assignment" and as is the case under the Patent Act, it fails to expressly 
provide a system for perfecting security interests in trademarks. Because of 
the absence of such a specific provision, courts have held that Article 9 of 
the U.C.C. is the body of Jaw governing the issue of how one perfects a 
security interest in a trademark -- while acknowledging that this subject 
"involves a trap for the unwary."" 
The court in In re Together Development Corp., in examining this 
issue, looked at the historical antecedents to the term "security interest" in 
order to determine whether an "assignment" would generally be thought of 
as a security interest. The court observed that, in 1946, the year the 
Lanham Act was passed, most security interests· were referred to as "chattel 
mortgages" or "conditional sales." Prior to the enactment of Article 9 in 
the early 1960's, most non-possessory pledges of interests in personal 
property were called "mortgages" or "hypothecations." An assignment was 
deemed to be a transfer of a different nature. 




" In re Together Development Corporation, 227 B.R. 439, 440-441 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1998). 
41 IDEA 297 (2002) 
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to phrase "successor to the business," concluding that Congress must have 
had in mind "an outright assignment in the context of the sale of an entire 
business of which the trademark is a part." Moreover, the court noted the 
express reference in the Copyright Act to the transfer of "mortgages" and 
concluded that the Lanham Act's language concerning the transfer of 
interests fails to provided a method of perfecting security interests in 
trademarks." Thus, the court concluded, Article 9 governs the issue of 
perfection of security interests in trademarks. 
This position is consistent with the progeny of cases that have 
consistently held that the Patent Act does not preempt Article 9 and that 
the Article filing office is the proper place to perfect a security interest in 
trademarks. In Roman Cleanser v. National Acceptance Co.," the court 
held that a security interest in a trademark is properly perfected by filing 
under Article 9, and such a transfer of interest is not equivalent to an 
assignment, which must be recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office. In 
In re 199Z, Inc., the creditor recorded its interest in the PTO, as well as filed 
an improper financing statement under Article 9." The court, in fmding 
secured creditor's interest to be unperfected, held that the Lanham Act does 
not preempt Article 9 because it does not expressly include provisions for 
recording security interests within its scope." 
B. 	 Characterization of Intellectual Property when used 
as Collateral 
Another concern central to the issue of the proper steps for 
perfection of security interests is how to characterize specific types of 
intellectual property for commercial law purposes. To illustrate, it is not 
necessarily clear how to properly characterize computer software. A 
prospective lender seeking to take a security interest in such software must 
first determine whether this software is copyrightable, patentable or 
protected as a trade secret, or characterized pursuant to Article 9, as 
"intangibles," or "ordinary goods."" If a copyright has been registered 
ld. at 441. 
Roman Cleanser v. National Acceptance Co., 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986). 
" In re 199z, Inc., 137 B.R. 778 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992). 
See id. 
" Moreover, if software is embodied in goods that are normally used in more than one 
jurisdiction, the software, if deemed to be an Article 9 asset, may be deemed to be 
"mobile goods." If the intellectual property embodied in the software is deemed to be 
general intangibles, the secured party must file a financing statement in the state where 
Volume 41 - Numbers 3 &4 
594 IDEA- The Journal of Law and Technology 
describing, with specificity, the software, then the place to register and thus 
perfect a security interest may be the Copyright Office. If however, a 
business method patent has been registered with the Patent and Trademark 
office, it may be deemed to be a general intangible, with the perfection 
location dictated by Article 9." 
The extent to which the software is determined to be copyrightable 
or patentable in the first instance, as well as how one perfects a security 
interest in an unregistered copyright, or in after acquired copyrights remains 
unclear. The number of unanswered questions that are raised by this one 
commercial scenario make the collateralization of many potentially 
patentable materials an uncertain venture and accordingly, creditors 
particularly vulnerable in bankruptcy. 
AVOIDANCE OF SECURITY INTERESTS AS PREFERENCES AND FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCES 
A. Preferential Transfers in Bankruptcy 
Another important bankruptcy context for the confusion over 
perfection is found in the area of preference law. The Bankruptcy Code 
allows for the avoidance of certain preferential transfers made upon the eve 
of bankruptcy. Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code requires a two-step 
inquiry to determine whether a given transfer qualifies for preferential 
avoidance. Section 547(b)" sets forth seven elements that must be 
the debtor is located. Cases have held that software products are to be as "ordinary 
goods,'' thus requiring a state law filing in the place where the "last event occurs on 
which is based the assertion that the security interest is perfected or unperfected." It 
should be noted that Revised Article 9 overrules the ~·software as ordinary goods" case 
law and defines software as a general intangible. Financing statements with respect to 
general intangibles are to filed in the place the debtor is located, which in the case of 
an organized entity, is in its place of organization. See Revised U.C.C. § § 9-102(a)(42) 
& (75), 9-307(b) & (e) (1999). 
" See U.C.C. § 9·103(3)(1997). Under revised Article 9 the place to file with respectto all 
collateral is debtor's "location," which is defined for corporate debtors as its state of 
organization. See Revised U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 307 (2000). 
II U.S.C. § 547(b) reads: [T] trustee may avoid the transfer of an interest of the debtor " 
in property B 
(I) to or for the benefit of creditor; 
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was 
made; 
41 IDEA 297 (2002) 
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established to prove an avoidable preference. These elements include (i) a 
transfer," (ii) of an interest in the debtor's property," (iii) to or for the 
benefit of a creditor," (iv) for or on account of an antecedent debt," (v) 
made while the debtor was insolvent," (vi) made on or within 90 days of 
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent; 
(4) made B 
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or 
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such 
creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and 
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if B 
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; 
(B) the transfer had not been made; and 
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provide. 
Section 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code broadly defines transfer to include: ... every" 
mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of 
disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including 
retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of 
redemption. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1997). 
Accordingly, the perfection of security interests, title transfers, and payments to 
creditors all fall within the definition of ''transfer" under the Bankruptcy Code .. 
In order to be subject to preference avoidance, the transfer must be of property the " 
debtor. 
" Section lOI(IO)(A)of the Bankruptcy Code defines "creditor" as "an entity that has a 
claim against the debtor that arose at the time ofor before the order for relief concerning 
the debtor." II U.S.C. § !Ol(IO)(A) (1997). "Claim" is broadly defined as a "right to 
payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, 
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured 
or unsecured." !I U.S.C. § 101(5)(B) (1997). Because one of the stated justifications 
for preference avoidance is to ensure equitable treatment among similarly situated 
creditors, it follows that the transferee have the status of a creditor with a claim to 
debtor's bankruptcy estate. 
The Bankruptcy Code does not specifically define the term "antecedent debt." Cases 
have determined that for a debt to be antecedent pursuant to§ 547, the transfer must 
come after the date of the incurrence of the debt. 
" The classic definition of an insolvent debtor is one whose liabilities exceeds it assets. 
Section § IOI(32) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "insolvent" as a "financial 
condition such that the sum of the entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's 
property, at fair valuation ...". II U.S.C. § 10I(32) (1997). The insolvency test is 
applied on the date the transfer is made. If a debtor is solvent at the time of the transfer 
in question, and later becomes insolvent and is insolvent at the time of bankruptcy, the 
insolvency test is not met, and the transfer is not vulnerable to preferential avoidance. 
The timing rules of Section 547(e) come into play in determining a debtor's solvency 
at the time of transfer, because the date a transfer is made may be determined with 
reference to the §547(e)(2)(B) grace period. Section 547(f) sets forth a presumption of 
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bankruptcy" (vii) that enables such creditor to receive more than they would 
receive under a chapter 7 distribution." If the trustee proves all seven 
elements," the trustee has established its prima facie case for a preference, 
and the transferee then has the burden of proving that one of the Section 
547(c) exceptions applies." Section 547(c) describes eight different 
insolvency during the 90 days preceding the bankruptcy filing. II U.S.C. § 547(1) 
(1999). This provision's legislative history explains the impetus behind the enactment 
of the presumption of insolvency during the 90 days prior to bankruptcy: 
Given the state of most debtor's books and records, such a task is nearly impossible. 
Given the financial condition of nearly all debtors in the three months before 
bankruptcy, the task is also generally not worth the effort. Rarely is a debtor solvent 
during the three mon~hs before bankruptcy. Thus, the preference section requires the 
trustee prove a fact that nearly always exists yet never can be proven with certainty. .. 
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1977). 
The burden is placed on the creditor to rebut this presumption, which likely will 
involve an examination of debtor's books and records and a valuation of its assets. In 
the case of a challenge to a transfer made to or for the benefit of an insider beyond the 
90 days prior to bankruptcy, the trustee is not granted the benefit of a presumption, and 
must prove insolvency with reference to the debtor's records. 
)6 	 Any transfer chal1enged as a preferencemust be made, if to a non-insider, within 90 days 
prior to debtor's bankruptcy filing. Transfers are potentially avoidable if made within 
one year of bankruptcy if the transferee is an "insider." "Insider" is defined under the 
Bankruptcy Code to include, a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the 
debtor, a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner, a general partner of the 
debtor, or a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control. 
If the debtor is a corporation, an insider is deemed to be a director of the debtor, an 
officer ofthe debtor, a person in control of the debtor, a partnership in which the debtor 
is a general partner, a general partner of the debtor, and a relative of a general partner, 
director, officer, or person in control of the debtor. See II U.S.C. § 101(31) (1997). 
" 	 The final focus of the preference analysis is "upon whether the creditor would have 
received less than a 100% payout in a Chapter 7 liquidation." See Smith v. Creative 
Financial Management, Inc. (In re Virginia-Carolina Financial Corp.), 954 F. 2d 193, 
193 (4th Cir. 1992). This test requires a comparison between the value of what the 
creditor received as a result of the transfer, and what the creditor would have received 
in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation, absent the transfer. This is measured "not by 
what the situation would have been if the debtor's assets had been liquidated and 
distributed among his creditors at the time the alleged preferential payment was made, 
but by the actual effect of the payment as determined by when bankruptcy results-" See 
id, citing Palmer Clay Products v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227,229 (1936). lfthe value of what 
was actually received is greater than the amount the creditor would have received in a 
liquidation, the hypothetical liquidation test is satisfied. 
" 	 In the case of a chapter II, a debtor in possession. "... a debtor in possession shall 
have all the rights, other than the right to compensation under section 330 of this title, 
and powers, and shall perfonn all the functions and duties . .. of a trustee serving in a 
case under this chapter." See II U.S.C. § 1107 (1997). 
" 	 Not all transfers made while the debtor is insolvent are deemed under the bankruptcy 
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circumstances in which an otherwise avoidable preferential transfer is 
granted a safe harbor from avoidance. These circumstances include (i) a 
contemporaneous exchange for new value," (ii) a transfer in the ordinary 
course of business," (iii) a transfer in connection with an enabling loan," (iv) 
a transfer followed by a subsequent advance of new value," ( v) transfer made 
in connection with a floating lien," (vi) statutory lien transfers,'4 (vii) 
transfers to satisfY domestic relations debts," and (viii) transfer made in 
small consumer transactions." While each of the seven section 547(b) 
elements must be present in order to find a preference, the transfer need 
only qualifY under one of the section 547(c) safe harbors to be saved from 
avoidance. 
To aid the trustee in its pursuit of avoidance, Section 547(f) sets 
forth a presumption of insolvency during the 90 days preceding the 
bankruptcy filing; a presumption that may only be overcome by the 
transferee's proof of sufficient evidence of solvency." Subsection 547(e) 
outlines the governing rules that define when a transfer is deemed to be 
made." 
The time of the transfer relative to the time the debt was incurred 
code to be preferential. Some transfers are deemed beneficial, notwithstanding the 
bankruptcy process. See II U.S.C. § 547(c)(l)- (8) (1997) Section 547(g) reads: "For 
purposes of this section, the trustee has the burden of proving the avoidability of a 
transfer under subsection (b) of this section, and the creditor or party in interest against 
whom recovery or avoidance is sought has the burden ofproving the nonavoidability 
of a transfer under subsection (c) of this section." 
See II U.S.C.§ 547(c)(l) (1997) . " 
., See II U.S.C.§ 547(c)(2) (1997). 

See II U.S.C.§ 547(c)(3) (1997) . 

., See II U.S.C.§ 547(c)(4) (1997). 
See 11 U.S.C.§ 547(c)(5) (1997). 
See 11 U.S.C.§ 547(c)(6) (1997) . 
.. 
" 
See 11 U.S. C.§ 547(c)(7) (1997). 

See II U.S.C.§ 547(c)(8) (1997) . 

.. 
See II U.S.C. § 547(g) (1997). 
This presumption only aids the trustee in cases where the transfer is made during the 
90 days· before a bankruptcy filing. For transfers made to insiders more than 90 days 
(but less than one year) before bankruptcy, the burden is the on trustee to prove 
insolvency, in the absence of a presumption. See II U.S.C. § 547(f) (1997) . 
.. See II U.S.C. § 547(e) (1997). In addition, § 547(a) provides the definition of 
"inventory", "new value" and "receivable." See II U.S.C. §§§ 547(a)(l), (a)(2) & (a)(3) 
(1997). 
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is of critical importance to a preference analysis. When filing or 
recordation is necessary to "perfect" the transferee's interest, Section 
547(e)(2)(B) is implicated. Because of the requirement that the transfer 
must be on account of an antecedent debt, the focus of the timing analysis 
is on whether there is a "gap" between the incurrence of the debt and the 
time of the transfer. The "antecedent debt" test is satisfied if the debt is 
incurred before, or antecedent to the date the transfer." 
Section 547(e)(2)(B) sets forth a ten day grace period within which 
transfers of interests may be perfected. With respect to security interests, 
this grace period begins on the date of attachment." If the transfer is 
perfected within the grace period, the date of the attachment will be deemed 
to be the date of the transfer." If, however, the transferee perfects its 
interest beyond ten days from the date of attachment, the transfer is deemed 
to take place on the date of perfection." If due to confusion and 
uncertainty as to how to perfect a security interest in patents or trademarks, 
the perfection is delayed beyond ten days from the date of the security 
interest attachment, the transfer is deemed to be a transfer "on account of 
an antecedent debt." If this happens within 90 days of a bankruptcy filing, 
the transfer is a preference subject to avoidance under § 547(b)." 
The case of City Bank and Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric (discussed 
above) provides a telling illustration of the trouble a creditor with an interest 
in patents or trademarks may find itself in when its debtor files for 
bankruptcy - even if it properly perfected its interest outside of the 90 day 
preference period. While ultimately reversed by the District Court, the 
bankruptcy court initially found that the recordation of a transfer of an 
interest in a patent in the Patent Office within the 90 day preference period 
" The justifications for the preference rules support the necessity of the requirement of 
transfers made on account of antecedent debt. If a debt is incurred contemporaneously 
with a transfer, there is no depletion of value from the estate as a result of such transfer. 
If creditors contribute value commensurate with their receipt of transfersof value, other 
creditors are not subject to harm. 
" ... A transfer is made ...(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor 
and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after, such time, .. 
.11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (1997). 
" If the section 547(e)(2)(A) grace period has not expired at the time bankruptcy is filed, 
the transferee may perfect its interest within the three month grace period without 
violating the automatic stay. See 1 I U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (1997). 
" See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (1997). 
" Notwithstanding the satisfaction of each ofthe section 547(b) elements of a preference, 
the transfer could still be saved if it falls within one of the "safe harbor .. exceptions of 
section 547(c). See II U.S.C. § 547(c) (1997). 
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was a preferential transfer. It appears in this case that the secured creditor 
was unsure as to the proper place to file to perfect its security interest, and 
thought the prudent course was to take a "belt and suspenders" approach. 
While not ultimately fatal to its interest in the collateral, it took two 
written opinions to reach the ultimate conclusion that the proper place to 
perfect a security interest in a patent is the Article 9 filing office. 
B. Transfers of License Interests as Preferences 
As noted above, to qualify as a-preference, a transfer must be on 
account of an antecedent debt. The date a debt is deemed to have been 
incurred turns on a non-bankruptcy law determination. When intellectual 
property is transferred as collateral or loan repayment or to otherwise 
secure an obligation, the debt is deemed to arise once the obligation becomes 
enforceable." Debts incurred in connection with absolute assignments of 
intellectual property are deemed to arise at the time title or control is 
transferred. When intellectual interests are licensed, However, the time the 
debt is incurred is less straightforward. 
If one looks at an intellectual property license as analogous to a real 
estate lease, the debt would be deemed to have been incurred 
contemporaneously with ea;ch periodic payment transfer. Accordingly, each 
transfer of a license interest would be on account of a contemporaneous 
debt. · 
An alternative view of a license for the use or exploitation of a 
patent or trademark, however, has the potential to raise some troubling 
preference issues. If the language of the license, or the context, suggests a 
one-time transfer of rights in exchange for periodic payments, then the debt 
would be deemed to have been incurredat the time the license agreement was 
entered into. Thus, each license payment would be considered a transfer on 
account of an antecedent debt. If a debtor files for bankruptcy during the 
term of the license agreement, any payments made (on account of an 
antecedent transfer of rights) within 90 days of bankruptcy are subject to 
avoidance as preferences. 
C. Avoidance of Fraudulent Conveyances 
Fraudulent conveyances are transfers prior to bankruptcy, made 
with either actual fraud, or with what is known as constructive fraud. When 
" City Bank v. Otto Fabric, 83 B.R. 780,781-82 (D. Kan. 1988). 
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a debtor is in bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee the power 
to avoid transfers qualifying as fraudulent under two independent provisions. 
Section 544(b) allows the trustee to avoid any transfer "by the debtor that 
is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that 
is allowable."" What this means is that any transfer that could be avoided 
by a creditor under state fraudulent conveyance act can be avoided by the 
trustee in bankruptcy." This provision allows the trustee to avoid transfers 
made within the state-law "look-back" period-- which can be as long as four 
years. Section 548 of the Bankruptcy gives the trustee powers to avoid 
fraudulent transfers without requiring that there be an unsecured creditor 
with an avoidable claim in bankruptcy." The section 548 "look-back" 
period is one year. 
Section 548 fraudulent conveyance law may be implicated when 
patents and trademarks are used as collateral for reasons similar to those 
discussed with respect to preferences. For there to be a fraudulent transfer, 
there must be a transfer of an interest -- and the transfer of a security 
interests qualify under this provision. If the security interest transfer is 
perfected within the "look-back" period, the transfer, if meeting the criteria 
for avoidance under section 548 or under state fraudulent conveyance law, 
is subject to avoidance. If due to confusion and uncertainty as to how to 
perfect a security interest in patents or trademarks, the perfection is delayed 
and spills into the look-back period, the transfer is vulnerable to defeat by 
the trustee as a fraudulent conveyance. 
" II U.S.C. § 544(b) (1997). 
To use section 544(b), there must be a creditor with an allowable claim in debtor's 
bankruptcy that could have avoided tbe transfer under state law. 
" Section 548( a)( I) reads: The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of tbe debtor 
in property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or 
within one year before the date of tiling of the petition, if tbe debtor voluntarily or 
involuntarily-( A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to 
hinder, delay or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the 
date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or (B) (i) 
received less than a reasonably equivalent in value in exchange for such transfer or 
obligation and (ii) (I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such 
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation; 
(Il) was engaged in business or a transaction, o9r was about to engage in business or 
a transaction. for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably 
small capital; or (Ill) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts 
that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured. II U.S.C. § 
548(a) (1997). 
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Constructive - Notice 
APPENDIX 27 - DEFINITIONS 
Goods that are physically united with other goods in 
such a manner that the identity of the original goods is 
not lost. U.C.C. § 9-102(a) 
A detailed statement of the mutual demands in the 
nature of debit and credit between parties, arising out 
of contracts or some fiduciary relation. Black's Law 
Dictionary 18 ( 6'" ed. 1990) 
The person who is obligated on an account, chattel 
paper or general intangible. U.C.C. § 9- 105(l)(a). 
A clause in a mortgage providing that any property 
acquired by the borrower after the date of the loan and 
mortgage will automatically become additional 
security for the loan. Black's Law Dictionary 61 (6'" 
ed. 1990) 
The act of transferring to another all or part of one's 
property, interests, or rights. Black's Law Dictionary 
119 (6'" ed. 1990) 
When the three basic prerequisites of a security 
interest exist (agreement, value, and collateral), the 
security agreement becomes enforceable between the 
parties and is said to "attach". Black's Law Dictionary 
126 (6'" ed. 1990) 
When a legal title holder of a patent transfers his or 
her title to a third party purchaser for value without 
notice of an outstanding equitable claim or title, the 
purchaser takes the entire ownership of the patent, free 
of any prior equitable encumbrance. This report p. 121 
A writing or writings which evidence both a monetary 
obligation and a security interest in or a lease of 
specific goods. Black's Law Dictionary 237 (6'" ed. 
1990) 
All business-related tort claims that do not involve 
personal injury or death. 
A condition which is to be performed before some 
right 
dependent thereon accrues, or some act dependent 
thereon is performed. Black's Law Dictionary 293 (6'" 
ed. 1990) 
Such notice as is implied or imputed by law, usually 
on the basis that the information is a part of a public 
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record or file, as in the case of notice of documents 
which have been recorded in the appsopriate registry 
of deeds or probate. Black's Law Dictionary 314 (6" 
ed. 1990) 
The common-law principle, codified repeatedly in the 
U.C.C., that a transferee of property acquires only the 
transferor's rights therein. Black's Law Dictionary 
444 ( 6" ed. 1990) 
Opinions of a judge which do not embody the 
resolution or determination of the specific case before 
the court. Black's Law Dictionary 454 (6" ed. 1990) 
A document setting out a secured party's security 
interest in goods. Black's Law Dictionary 631 (6" ed. 
1990) 
A comprehensive package of amendments to the tract 
recording provisions of the Copyright Act, the 
Lanham Act, the Patent Act and the Semiconductor 
Chip Protection Act. This report p. 12 
Any personal property (including things in action) 
other than goods, accounts, contract rights, chattel 
paper, documents, instruments, and money. Black's 
Law Dictionary 684 (6"' ed. 1990) 
A11 things that are moveable when a security interest 
attaches. U.C.C. § 9-102(a) 
A negotiable instrument or any other writing that 
evidences a right to the payment of a monetary 
obligation, is not itself a security agreement or lease, 
and is of a type that in ordinary course of business is 
transferred by delivery with any necessary 
endorsement or assignment. U.C.C. § 9-102(a) 
Federal statute enacted in 1946 which revised federal 
trademark law and registration process. Black's Law 
Dictionary 880 (6"' ed. 1990) 
One whose debt or claim is secured by a lien on 
particular property, as distinguished from a .. general" 
creditor, who has no such security. Black's Law 
Dictionary 923 (6"' ed. 1990) 
Tenn referring to the set of templates or "masks" that 
together make up the design of a semiconductor chip. 
The chip manufacturer uses these masks in a 
photographic depositing and etching process to build 
up the three-dimensional structure of the chip. This 
report p.l5 
In secured transactions law, the process whereby a 
security interest is protected, as far as the law permits, 
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against competing claims to the collateral, which 
usually requires the secured party to give public notice 
of the interest as by filing in a government office. 
Black's Law Dictionary 1137 (6" eel. 1990) 
Doctrine adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court holding 
that certain matters are of such a national, as opposed 
to local, character that federal laws preempt or take 
precedence over state laws. Black's Law Dictionary 
117 (6" eel. 1990) 
In bankruptcy, refers to secured claims that by statute 
receive more favorable treatment than other unsecured 
claims. Black's Law Dictionary 1194 (6" eel. 1990) 
The following property: 
A) whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license, 
exchange, or other disposition ofcollateral; 
B) whatever is collected on, or distributed on 
account of, collateral; 
C) rights arising out of collateral; 
D) to the extent of the value of collateral, claims 
arising out of the loss, nonconformity, or 
interference with the use of, defects or 
infringement of rights in, or damage to, the 
collateral; or 
E) 	 to the extent of the value of collateral and to the 
extent payable to the debtor or the secured party, 
insurance payable by reason of the loss or 
nonconformity of , defects or infringement of 
rights in, or damage to, the collateral. U.C.C. §9­
102(a) 
One which is taken or retained by seller of item to 

secure its price or taken by person who advances 

funds to enable one to acquire rights in collateral. 

Black's Law Dictionary 1235 (6"' eel. 1990) 

A form of interest in property which provides that the 

property may be sold on default in order to satisfy the 

obligation for which the security interest is given. 

Black's Law Dictionary 1357 (6"' ed. 1990) 

Duty or labor to be rendered by one person to another, 

the former being bound to submit his will to the 

direction and control of the latter. Black's Law 

Dictionary 1368 ( 6"' ed. 1990) 

A computer program and any supporting information 

provided in connection with a transaction relating to 

the program. This report p. 25 

One of the Uniform Laws drafted by the National 

Conference of Commissioner's on Uniformed State 
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Valuable consideration ­
Venture capital ­
Laws and the American Law Institute governing 
commercial transactions. Black's Law Dictionary 
1531 (6"' ed. 1990). 
A class of consideration upon which a promise may be 
founded, which entitles the promisee to enforce his 
claim against an unwilling promisor. Black's Law 
Dictionary 1550 (6"' ed. 1990) 
Funding for new companies or others embarking on 
new or turnaround ventures that entails some 
investment risk but offers the potential for above 
average future profits. Black's Law Dictionary 1556 
(6"' ed. 1990) 
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